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1. Introduction
Industrial control system (ICS) networks are commonly deployed to sup-
port the operation of critical infrastructure assets. Historically, industrial
control networks have incorporated special-purpose embedded devices that
communicate using proprietary protocols. During the past decade, however,
the trend has been to adopt the TCP/IP protocol stack and use commercial
oﬀ-the-shelf devices.
Despite the use of TCP/IP, communications in industrial control networks
diﬀer signiﬁcantly from communications in the Internet or oﬃce local-area
networks. In an industrial control network, data is continuously retrieved
from ﬁeld devices such as programmable logic controllers (PLCs), so that
a real-time view of the supported industrial processes can be established.
Typically, data is retrieved via automated, periodic polling processes run by
industrial control devices (i.e., master devices). Manual interventions, such
as sending commands to ﬁeld devices, are rare. As a consequence, traﬃc reg-
ularities arise – the set of communicating nodes is stable and network traﬃc
exhibits strong periodic patterns [3]. In fact, well-known characteristics of
Internet traﬃc [12], such as self-similarity and heavy-tailedness, are generally
absent [4].
This paper presents a novel approach for learning models of industrial
control network traﬃc; the approach is automated in a tool named Perio-
dAnalyser. Traﬃc models of industrial control networks are important in
several application areas. For example, the trend toward TCP/IP-based
protocols has made industrial control networks more vulnerable to the same
threats that plague traditional information technology networks [11].
Due to the presence of large numbers of zero-day attacks, anomaly-based
intrusion detection in industrial control networks is of particular interest [8].
In information technology networks, anomaly-based approaches typically ex-
hibit high false-positive error rates due to the enormous variability of network
traﬃc [22]. In contrast, the regularities present in industrial control network
traﬃc make anomaly detection very promising. The models learned by Perio-
dAnalyser can be viewed as whitelists of valid commands and the frequencies
at which they are sent. These whitelists provide protection against a number
of attacks, including data injection and denial-of-service attacks.
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Traﬃc models are also needed to generate synthetic traﬃc traces. Such
traces, combined with attack traﬃc, can be used as the ground truth for
testing and evaluating intrusion detection systems. Alternatively, the syn-
thetic traces could be used to evaluate the performance of industrial control
devices.
An extensive search of the literature reveals that the automated approach
presented in this paper is the ﬁrst to directly exploit periodicity in industrial
control network traﬃc. Message repetition and timing information are used
to detect periodic cycles in the traﬃc; this addresses the limitations of exist-
ing approaches. The approach is validated using traﬃc traces collected from
operational industrial control networks – two water treatment plant networks
and one electric-gas utility network.
2. Related work
The problem of periodic traﬃc pattern identiﬁcation is diﬀerent from the
classical problem of cycle detection, which is solved by Floyd’s algorithm [19].
The classical cycle detection problem involves (eﬃciently) detecting that a
(large) sequence has become periodic under the assumption that the sequence
is perfectly periodic. In contrast, the problem considered in this paper is sim-
ilar to the problem of periodicity detection in temporal data studied by the
data mining community [20]. In the data mining context, the problem in-
volves ﬁnding repeating patterns in a time series of symbols from a certain
alphabet, typically represented as a string (e.g., abcdabyzabfg). The ap-
proach proposed in [16] allows for imperfect patterns (i.e., patterns that do
not reoccur in every cycle) and partial patterns (i.e., only a subset of the
patterns are periodic). For example, the substring ab is considered to be
periodic in the string abcdabyzabfg.
The diﬃculty in applying such methods to network traﬃc is to deﬁne a
proper time bin size (i.e., interval between two symbols) in order to create
the time series. If the chosen time bin size is too large, unrelated network
messages end up in the same time bin and, hence, are represented by only one
symbol; this obfuscates the periodic pattern. A very small time bin size could
be used to reduce the extent of this problem, but not completely, because
TCP can merge multiple application protocol data units (PDUs) into a single
segment, causing the protocol data units to be observed at identical times.
In addition, this solution is not eﬃcient because it produces many empty
time bins and long symbol strings.
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Spectral analysis is commonly used to uncover periodicity in network traf-
ﬁc (see, e.g., [1, 6, 14]). Van Splunder [24] proposes an approach based on the
variance of packet inter-arrival times to detect network traﬃc periodicity. In
previous work [5], the authors of this paper investigated the idea of detecting
anomalies in the periodic behavior of industrial control network traﬃc using
tools such as discrete Fourier transforms and autocorrelation functions. The
main limitation of these methods is the so-called “semantic gap” due to the
fact that they operate on information based on the observed network packets
(e.g., number of packets or bytes sent per time interval). While it is rela-
tively easy to detect periodic activities using this information, little insight
is provided into which packets caused the periodic behavior [16].
The work by Goldenberg and Wool [13] is closely related to the research
presented in this paper. Based on the observation that traﬃc exchanged be-
tween a human-machine interface (HMI) and a programmable logic controller
consists of requests for the same values being sent periodically, Goldenberg
and Wool attempted to model Modbus traﬃc using a deterministic ﬁnite
automaton (DFA). The automaton captures the order in which requests and
their respective responses are normally exchanged and triggers alarms when
an unexpected transition (i.e., unexpected sequence of two messages) is ob-
served. The approach is able to automatically learn an automaton from a
training set. However, because only a single automaton is used per connec-
tion, a connection carrying requests sent with diﬀerent periods results in a
large model. Moreover, small ﬂuctuations that change the relative order of
messages are not captured by the model. Goldenberg and Wool propose a
two-level approach that reduces (but does not eliminate) the problem. A
second limitation is that the model of Goldenberg and Wool captures the
order of messages but not their inter-arrival times. For instance, the model
cannot distinguish when a sequence of requests is sent every ten minutes and
when the same requests are sent every ten milliseconds.
More recently, Caselli et al. [7] proposed a general approach to detect
sequence attacks – sequences of “valid” events (e.g., network messages, log
entries and variable values) that have an adverse impact on a system. Their
sequence-aware intrusion detection system models normal behavior using
discrete-time Markov chains. Anomalies are detected when unknown states
are reached or unlikely or unknown transitions occur. Although periodic be-
havior can be indirectly captured in terms of sequences of states, complex
periodic patterns (e.g., multiple periods with possible drift because of timing
variations), which are addressed in the present work, would either result in
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a large model or a compact model that only provides a fuzzy description of
the real process.
3. Period analysis
This section describes a novel approach for learning periodic traﬃc pat-
terns and the implementation of the approach in the PeriodAnalyser tool.
Although the approach does not rely on deterministic ﬁnite automata, as in
the case of the Goldenberg-Wool methodology [13], communications to and
from programmable logic controllers are modeled as a series of requests (and
their responses).
PeriodAnalyser is composed of three modules: (i) Multiplexer; (ii) To-
kenizer; and (iii) Learner. The Multiplexer module preprocesses the moni-
tored network traﬃc and separates it into diﬀerent ﬂows. Next, the Tokenizer
module transforms each packet into a protocol-independent format called a
token. Finally, the Learner module processes each token to identify and
characterize periodic activities called cycles. The information embodied in
all the identiﬁed cycles constitutes the model of industrial control network
communications.
It is important to acknowledge that the information captured by the
Learner module might already be known (partially) to industrial control sys-
tem operators or, alternatively, it could be extracted from the conﬁguration
ﬁles [15]. Consequently, this information could be used directly instead of
learning it from the network traﬃc, thereby eliminating the need for the
Learner module. However, experience with real-world critical infrastructure
assets has shown that this information is not readily available or it is incom-
plete at best.
3.1. Requirements
The following four requirements have inﬂuenced the design of PeriodAnal-
yser:
• Multiple cycles: Multiple activities with diﬀerent periods can occur in
the same network connection. For instance, suppose requests R1, R2,
R3 and R4 are sent by a master device to a ﬁeld device every 1 s, 1 s,
1 s and 2 s, respectively. Then, the proposed approach should identify
two cycles: (i) one cycle with a period of 1 s consisting of the requests
R1, R2 and R3; and (ii) one cycle with a period of 2 s containing only
the request R4.
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• Periodicity at diﬀerent aggregation levels: Periodic patterns can be ob-
served on “short-lived” or “long-lived” network connections. An indus-
trial control system application may establish a new TCP connection
for each cycle of the periodic message exchange, resulting in many
short-lived connections. Alternatively, it may establish one long-lived
connection that persists for several minutes or hours.
• Request reordering: The order of requests in a cycle iteration is not
necessarily ﬁxed. For example, iterations R1, R2, R3 and R1, R3, R2
should be considered equal. The lack of order can be caused, for in-
stance, by a multithreading implementation of the application issuing
the requests, where multiple threads compete for access to the network
interface.
• Timing variations: Small variations in cycle timing should be expected.
Delays and jitter can be introduced by the network [25] or by the
server that generates the requests. For example, an application can be
preempted if the load on the server is high. Aside from delays, packets
can be lost, either by the network or by the measurement equipment.
3.2. Multiplexer module
The Multiplexer module ﬁlters industrial control protocol packets, dis-
cards the non-control-system traﬃc and multiplexes the packets onto dif-
ferent ﬂows. This work considers two common industrial control protocols:
Modbus/TCP and MMS. The ﬁltering is performed by identifying all the
packets that contain Modbus or MMS application headers. Both protocols
use TCP as the transport layer protocol. Packets that do not carry appli-
cation data, such as TCP ACK packets or TCP handshaking packets, are
discarded.
Two types of TCP connections were observed in the experimental datasets:
(i) long-lived connections containing requests sent at periodic intervals; and
(ii) short-lived connections that were established (and torn down) at periodic
intervals. After ﬁltering, packets belonging to the ﬁrst type were grouped to
a ﬂow using the ﬁve-tuple: (Server Address, IP Protocol, Server Port, Client
Address, Client Port) as the grouping key. The second type of packets were
grouped using the four-tuple: (Server Address, IP Protocol, Server Port,
Client Address) to aggregate the connections in a single ﬂow. Short connec-
tions were detected based on their durations. In the experimental datasets,
short connections typically had durations below one second.
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Table 1: Mapping of Modbus and MMS protocol data units to tokens.
Protocol PDU Message Identifier Pair Identi-
fier
Modbus
Request length field, unit identi-
fier, function code, data
transaction ID
Response – transaction ID
MMS
Conﬁrmed
request
confirmedServiceRequest
and optional ﬁelds
invokeID
Conﬁrmed
response
– invokeID
Unconﬁrmed
request
unconfirmedService and
optional ﬁelds
None
Initiate
request
“initiate” “initiate”
Initiate
response
– “initiate”
Conclude
request
“conclude” “conclude”
Conclude
response
– “conclude”
3.3. Tokenizer module
The Tokenizer module transforms the packets that were ﬁltered and
grouped by the Multiplexer module to a common protocol-independent for-
mat. The resulting packets are passed to the Learner module. Note that
only the Tokenizer and Multiplexer modules need to be adapted in order to
accommodate new industrial control protocols.
For each observed packet, the Tokenizer module outputs a tuple compris-
ing its timestamp and a token. If the packet has a request message, the token
consists of two parts: (i) message identiﬁer, which identiﬁes the request; and
(ii) pair identiﬁer, which pairs the request and response messages. If the
packet contains a response message, the token consists only of the pair iden-
tiﬁer. Note that, whereas the contents of request messages (e.g., “get pump
pressure”) are expected to be repeated periodically, the contents of response
messages (e.g., pressure value) are likely to vary considerably.
The token is based on application header ﬁelds; therefore, its generation is
protocol dependent. Table 1 lists the protocol ﬁelds extracted from Modbus
and MMS protocol data units to generate the message identiﬁer and pair
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identiﬁer that form a token.
3.4. Learner module
The Learner module processes the output of the Tokenizer module ﬂow-
by-ﬂow with the goal of identifying all the cycles in each ﬂow. To accomplish
this, the sequence of requests in a ﬂow is split into candidate iterations. If
N identical candidate iterations are observed, then the learning algorithm
concludes that there is enough evidence for a cycle. Unlike the approach
described in [13], it is not necessary to send requests in a ﬁxed sequence to
identify candidates. Instead, it is assumed that repeated requests delimit
candidates – once a repeated request is observed, a new candidate cycle
begins. This means that the same request does not appear in diﬀerent cycles.
Issuing the same request in diﬀerent cycles (i.e., with diﬀerent frequencies)
is ineﬃcient and should not occur in a real industrial control network.
To illustrate the approach, consider the sequence abcdcdbadcbaabcd of
periodic requests a, b, c and d. The second appearance of c marks the
beginning of a new candidate cycle. As a result, four candidate cycles are
obtained, abcd, cdba, dcba and abcd, each containing all four requests. If the
network traﬃc were to be captured at a later moment, say at the ﬁrst d, then
the ﬁrst candidate would be dc, the second candidate would be dba and the
third and fourth candidates would be dcba and abcd, respectively. Following
the deﬁnition, only the last two candidates would be considered as identical
(and identiﬁed as a cycle if N = 2), while the ﬁrst two candidates would be
ignored. This demonstrates that the algorithm is able to synchronize itself
to a cycle.
Having identiﬁed a group of N identical candidate cycles, it is necessary to
verify if they demonstrate regular timing behavior. This is accomplished by
calculating the duration of each candidate cycle. The duration of a candidate
cycle is deﬁned as the time between its ﬁrst request and the ﬁrst request
of the following candidate cycle. If the diﬀerence between the minimum
and maximum duration of a candidate cycle is above a threshold durthr , the
candidate cycle is rejected because the grouping of the requests may have
occurred by chance. Experiments revealed that durthr = 1 s worked well.
Such delay variations should not occur in typical healthy industrial control
networks even with highly ﬂuctuating network latencies.
A preprocessing step is introduced to handle multiple cycles with diﬀerent
periods and non-periodic messages more eﬃciently. The preprocessing step
groups requests according to their number of occurrences. The idea is that
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Algorithm 1 : Learner module algorithm.
Input : A tokenized ﬂow and parameters N, , durthr
Output: A list of tuples (request set, durmin , durmax , durstd )
/* Step 1: group requests */
count request occurrences;
group requests with same counter ±;
for each group do
for each subset in group do
/* Step 2: find candidates */
for each request in subset do
candidates ← N repeating cycles;
/* Step 3: test candidates */
durmin , durmax ← minimum and maximum candidate durations;
if durmax − durmin < durthr
durstd ← cycle duration standard deviation;
store (request set, durmin , durmax , durstd );
continue to next subset;
else
reset candidates;
end
ignore remaining subset requests as non-periodic;
end
end
requests sent with the same frequency occur roughly the same number of
times in the training data. In case multiple cycles are present in a ﬂow, their
requests should have diﬀerent numbers of occurrences and, thus, should be
separated during the preprocessing step. Similarly, non-periodic requests are
likely to have diﬀerent numbers of occurrences from periodic requests. Note,
however, that even messages in the same cycle may have diﬀerent numbers
of occurrences (e.g., if the duration T of the training set is not a multiple of
the cycle duration or if requests are lost).
A tolerance  is speciﬁed to deal with this issue. Requests with approx-
imately the same number of occurrences (±) are assumed to belong to the
same group. In the experiments,  was set to one.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo-code for the Learner module. The algo-
rithm can be split into three steps:
1. Group requests: Count the number of occurrences of each request and
create groups of requests with the same numbers of occurrences ±.
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2. Find candidate cycles: Search each group for candidate cycles. A candi-
date cycle starts as an empty set. Requests are added to the candidate
cycle until a request is repeated, triggering the creation of a new candi-
date cycle. If N identical candidate cycles are found, proceed to Step 3.
If not, iteratively test all subset combinations of requests in the group.
Requests that fail all the subsets are reported as non-periodic. The
message order in a candidate cycle is irrelevant.
3. Test candidate cycles: Calculate the minimum and maximum dura-
tions durmin and durmax of all the candidate cycles and verify if the
diﬀerence is above the threshold durthr . If the test succeeds, return the
set of requests in the cycle, its duration range durmin and durmax , and
standard deviation durstd . If the test fails, return to Step 2 and ﬁnd
another candidate cycle set.
The time complexity of the algorithm is exponential with the number
of messages of the largest group identiﬁed in the ﬁrst step of the algorithm
because all subset combinations are tested. Suppose that n is the size of
the largest group. In the worst case, where all the requests are not periodic,
the algorithm has to test
(
n
n
)
+
(
n
n−1
)
+
(
n
n−2
)
+ · · ·+ (n
1
)
= 2n − 1 combina-
tions. However, all request combinations are not tested blindly. In Step 1,
initial groups are formed by grouping requests with roughly the same num-
bers of occurrences. Furthermore, non-periodic requests may be discarded
when searching for candidate cycles in Step 2. Note that it is assumed that
periodic request-response pairs represent the majority of the traﬃc. During
the experiments, it was observed that the Learner module always terminated
after a relatively short time. In the worst case, it took 100ms to learn 30min
of traﬃc on a computer with a 2.66GHz Intel Core 2 Duo processor.
4. Evaluation
This section evaluates the proposed approach using datasets collected
from real industrial control networks. The central questions are whether the
empirical industrial control network traﬃc follows the periodicity assump-
tions and whether PeriodAnalyser can accurately learn the traﬃc charac-
teristics. The amount of input data needed by the Learner module is also
analyzed. Furthermore, the issue of whether or not ﬂows identiﬁed as peri-
odic change their behavior later is examined.
To perform the evaluation, a new Monitor module is incorporated to de-
tect deviations in the traﬃc from the cycle models learned by PeriodAnalyser.
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Flows
Testing Set
Tokenizer
Monitor
Learner
Training Set 
Alarms
CyclesMultiplexerPackets
Figure 1: PeriodAnalyser evaluation approach.
Table 2: Overview of the datasets.
Name Hosts Duration Avg. Pkts/s Avg. KB/s
Modbus 45 13 days 504.1 82.5
MMS 1 14 10 days 28.7 5.1
MMS 2 11 1.5 days 137.8 24.0
Figure 1 presents the evaluation approach. The traﬃc is ﬁrst preprocessed
by the Multiplexer and Tokenizer modules. During the training phase, a
portion of the dataset is processed by the Learner module with the goal of
identifying and characterizing the cycles. After the training phase has con-
cluded, the Monitor module uses the cycle information to detect deviations
in the remainder of the dataset. Obviously, the Monitor module works as
an anomaly detector, with the cycle information describing the normal (ex-
pected) communications behavior. Section 5.1 discusses how PeriodAnalyser
and the Monitor module can be used to construct an anomaly-based intrusion
detection system for industrial control networks.
4.1. Datasets
The experiments employed network traﬃc traces collected from three real-
world industrial control networks, two at water treatment facilities and one
at an electric-gas utility. One network used the Modbus protocol while the
other two used MMS. The durations of the datasets range from one to 13
days of data and each dataset contains traﬃc from 11 to 45 hosts. Table 2
presents an overview of the datasets used in the experiments.
Each ﬂow in the datasets was divided into a training set and a testing set.
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Token
Request
Known
Forward to Cycle Monitor
Unknown
New Request!
Response
No matching request
Unmatched Response!
Matching request
Do nothing.
Cycle Monitor
IDLE
dur ∈ [durmin,durmax]
New iteration
dur > durmax
Long Iteration!
New iteration
dur < durmin
Repeated Request!
Not IDLE
dur > durmax
Incomplete Iteration!
New iteration
dur ≤ durmax
In iteration
Repeated Request!
Not in iteration
Add to iteration
New Iteration
One or more unmatched request
Unmatched Request(s)!
No unmatched requests
Add to iteration
Complete
Set IDLE True
Incomplete
Set IDLE False
Figure 2: Decision graph used by the Monitor module.
Unless stated otherwise, the training set consisted of the ﬁrst 30 min of a ﬂow
and the testing set comprised the remainder of the traﬃc. Since all three
datasets contained more than one day of data and the expected periodicity
was in the order of a few seconds, this choice was a good compromise between
an adequate number of samples and the lengths of the datasets.
4.2. Monitoring periodic behavior changes
The Monitor module observes network traﬃc in the testing set and raises
alarms if its behavior does not match the cycles discovered by the Learner
module when it processed the training set.
Figure 2 shows the decision graph used by the Monitor module. Each
cycle identiﬁed previously by the Learner module is monitored by the inde-
pendent Monitor module. Hence, the ﬁrst step undertaken by the Monitor
module is to identify the cycle to which an incoming packet (represented by a
token) belongs. If the token is an unknown request (i.e., it does not belong to
any cycle), a New Request alarm is raised. If the token is a response without
a previously-received matching request (identiﬁed by the pair identiﬁer), an
Unmatched Response alarm is raised.
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The Monitor module can be idle or not idle. If the Monitor module is idle,
then all requests belonging to the cycle have been observed in the current
iteration and the currently-processed request is the potential beginning of a
new iteration. The duration of the current iteration is deﬁned as the time
elapsed between the ﬁrst request of the current iteration and the arrival of
the currently-processed request. If the duration is greater than the allowed
maximum durmax , a Long Iteration alarm is raised. If the duration is less than
the allowed minimum durmin , a Repeated Request alarm is raised because
the request is regarded as a repetition of an already-observed request during
the current iteration. Finally, if the duration is between durmin and durmax , a
new iteration is begun. At this point, Unmatched Request alarms are raised
if there are requests for which no corresponding responses are observed.
If the Monitor module is not idle, then the current cycle has not com-
pleted. The Monitor module tests if the duration of the current iteration
(as deﬁned above) exceeds the allowed maximum duration durmax . If this is
true, an Incomplete Iteration alarm is raised because the iteration has failed
to complete in time. If not, a test is performed to check if the request has
been already seen in the current iteration; if this is true, a Repeated Request
alarm is raised.
Finally, the request is added to the current iteration and the state of
the Monitor module changes accordingly. Note that the Monitor module is
initially designated as being not idle.
As discussed in Section 3.1, small timing variations may occur. In order
to make the Monitor more robust, the following durmin and durmax thresh-
olds (which are more relaxed than those used by the Learner module) are
employed:
durmin = durmin,learned −max(minthr , 2durstd)
durmax = durmax ,learned +max(maxthr , 2durstd)
(1)
The values of the minthr and maxthr thresholds are discussed in Section 4.4.
4.3. Validating the communications model
The ﬁrst test seeks to verify the basic assumption that industrial control
network traﬃc consists of a series of periodic requests and that responses can
be represented by the cycle model. The next task is to distinguish between
three types of ﬂows: (i) ﬂows that do not show any periodic behavior in the
training set; (ii) ﬂows that are periodic in the training set but present new
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Table 3: Number of ﬂows per type.
Dataset Periodic Periodic Flows with Non-Periodic
Flows New Requests Flows
Modbus 19 4 1
MMS 1 9 0 14
MMS 2 15 0 5
requests in the testing set; and (iii) ﬂows that are periodic in the training and
testing sets. To perform this task, it is necessary to test whether the Learner
module can ﬁnd two identical candidate cycles (N = 2). Additionally, New
Request alerts raised by the Monitor module are checked. Note that this
test does not consider timing-related issues reported by the Monitor module
(e.g., Long Iteration alerts).
Table 3 shows the results of the test. Most ﬂows observed in the datasets
ﬁt the assumption that the traﬃc consists of a series of periodic requests and
responses. In the Modbus dataset, only one ﬂow is reported as non-periodic.
In the combined MMS datasets, 24 of 43 ﬂows are periodic. The high number
of non-periodic ﬂows is expected because MMS implements more advanced
control schemes than Modbus. The diﬀerence also reﬂects the scenarios for
which the two protocols were designed to be used. Modbus is a typical su-
pervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) protocol that supports only
simple supervisory commands. In contrast, MMS is a typical distributed con-
trol system (DCS) protocol, which supports advanced commands that enable
tight integration with closed process control loops. Nonetheless, more than
one-half of the MMS ﬂows consist only of series of periodic requests, demon-
strating that the proposed algorithm can be used to monitor a considerable
number of ﬂows in distributed control system environments.
Four of the periodic ﬂows in the Modbus dataset contain new requests.
Two ﬂows are likely due to manual activity and the other two are clock
synchronization ﬂows. The ﬂows with suspected manual activity are mostly
periodic, except for short intervals when up to three new (read) requests
are observed. Note that the false alarms generated by human activity could
be avoided by correlating information from other sources, such as logs from
industrial control system servers (if available) and resource management sys-
tems.
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Figure 3(a) shows an example clock synchronization ﬂow. The clock
synchronization ﬂows contain write messages for values from 0 to 59 issued
hourly (representing each minute) and from 0 to 23 issued daily (representing
each hour). Such behavior obviously cannot be learned using the original
30min training set. It requires at least 25 h of training data with N = 1
(although the pattern has a 24 h period, the Learner module requires an
additional hour to detect a repeated request, which delimits the end of a
candidate cycle). However, this would not eliminate all the New Request
alarms – in addition to the hourly and daily write messages, a weekly pattern
of requests writing values from 0 to 7 is detected (the ﬁrst one is marked
with a red circle in Figure 3(a)). Other requests repeat after nine days (not
shown), suggesting even longer cycles, but the dataset is not suﬃciently large
to conﬁrm this behavior.
Three Modbus ﬂows show periodic patterns where the order in which
the requests are sent is not ﬁxed. An example is shown in Figure 3(b).
This lack of order could have been caused by a multi-threaded application
(as anticipated in Section 3.1). Such periodic patterns cannot be modeled
correctly by the approach of Goldenberg and Wool [13] because it assumes
that the order in which requests are issued is ﬁxed.
Figure 3(c) shows a typical non-periodic ﬂow in the MMS datasets. A
remarkable aspect of these ﬂows is the presence of long periods of “well-
behaved periodicity” (e.g., between 10 h and 15 h). Applying the Learner
module (and later the Monitor module) to these periods reveals perfectly
periodic patterns. Note that the learned requests are conﬁrmed requests
that issue read commands to an unconstrained address. The new requests are
also read commands, but with slightly modiﬁed addresses. This work assumes
that some of the new requests simply replace the old address without breaking
the periodic pattern. Unfortunately, the semantics of the addresses are not
deﬁned by the standard (i.e., they are vendor-dependent). The veriﬁcation
of this assumption is a topic for future research.
Table 4 provides an overview of the diﬀerent types of periodic behavior
observed in the datasets by further classifying each periodic ﬂow according to
three characteristics. First, ﬂows are classiﬁed as containing single or multiple
cycles. Second, ﬂows are classiﬁed as containing single or multiple requests
per cycle; for a ﬂow to have multiple requests, it is suﬃcient that at least
one of its cycles contains more than one request. Third, ﬂows are classiﬁed
as single or multiple connections per ﬂow; single connection ﬂows represent
long-lived connections with periodic requests while multiple connection ﬂows
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Table 4: Number of ﬂows per type.
Cycles Requests Connections Modbus MMS 1 MMS 2
Single Single Single 14 2 4
Single Multiple Single 3 2 0
Single Multiple Multiple 0 5 2
Multiple Multiple Single 2 0 9
represent periodic short-lived connections.
The majority of periodic ﬂows consist of a single cycle with a single pe-
riodic request over a single long-lived connection. However, all the other
combinations are also present in the datasets. This diversity in periodic be-
havior clearly demonstrates the need to have the two requirements of multiple
cycles and periodicity at diﬀerent aggregation levels discussed in Section 3.1.
4.4. Impact of N
This section examines the impact of the number of required candidate
cycles N on the learned traﬃc models. It is anticipated that using more
candidate cycles when patterns are being learned provides better estimates
of the durmin and durmax thresholds, and thus, generates fewer false alarms
due to normal variations in the durations of cycles.
Figure 6 shows plots of the number of alarms a (x-axis) generated by the
Monitor module versus the number of ﬂows that generate a or less alarms
(y-axis) for a given value of N . For ease of visualization, only the results for
N = 4, 8, . . . , 24 are shown. Note that only time-based alarms are considered.
In other words, a is the sum of the Long Iteration, Incomplete Iteration and
Repeated Request alarms. Other alarm types are not relevant with respect
to N .
In the case of the Modbus dataset (Figure 4(a)), the number of alarms
is independent of N ; in other words, all the characteristics of the cycles can
be reliably learned when N = 2. Only three ﬂows present alarms (two of
them also present the New Request alarms discussed in the previous section).
The time-based alarms are caused by an “extra” iteration that does not ﬁt
the periodic behavior. Repeated Request alarms are generated for every
request sent during this extra iteration. In addition, these requests cause
the Monitor module to lose its synchronization with the periodic pattern,
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Table 5: Numbers of alarms in diﬀerent scenarios.
Scenario Modbus MMS 1 MMS 2
N = 4 89 108,599 59,704
N = 20 89 76 21,126
Manual – 4 309
which in turn, causes the Monitor module to generate a few (false) alarms
until it can synchronize with the periodic pattern. It appears that this extra
iteration is triggered by manual access. In a real-world deployment that
uses PeriodAnalyser to detect anomalies in industrial control network traﬃc
(discussed in Section 5.1), these alarms could be aggregated into fewer alarms.
As seen in Figure 4(b), the number of candidate cycles N has a large
impact on the number of alarms for the MMS 1 dataset. For N = 4 and
N = 8 (the lines overlap), ﬁve ﬂows present more than 104 alarms. These
alarms appear to be caused by high network delays, therefore it is necessary
to use more than eight candidate cycles to obtain good values of the cycle
duration thresholds. Most of the delay variability is captured when N = 12,
but the number of alarms reduces until N = 20. At this point, most ﬂows
present ten or fewer alarms. Two of the ﬂows still present more than 20
alarms with N = 20. No improvements are observed when N > 20 (the lines
for N = 20 and N = 24 overlap).
Figure 4(c) shows the results for the MMS 2 dataset. Increasing the value
of N reduces the number of alarms until N = 20; and no improvements are
observed when N > 20 (again, the lines for N = 20 and N = 24 overlap).
Even with N = 20, four ﬂows present a very large number of alarms – up to
104.
Table 5 shows the numbers of alarms in three scenarios: (i) N = 4; (ii)
N = 20; and (iii) manual adjustments of minthr and maxthr to reduce the
number of alarms. As discussed above, the alarms observed in the Modbus
dataset are caused by real anomalies (i.e., deviations from periodic behavior)
and cannot be eliminated by adjusting the parameters. However, in the case
of the MMS 1 dataset, it is possible to reduce the number of alarms to four
by manually adjusting the minthr and maxthr thresholds to 1 s. The choice
seems reasonable because the periods of the learned cycles in these ﬂows are
around 21 s.
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In the case of the MMS 2 dataset, the alarms are caused by very large
variations in the iteration durations; the average duration is approximately
1 s, but durations of 0.5 s are also common in these ﬂows. Upon setting minthr
to 0.7 s, 309 alarms are still observed. Note that these ﬂows together contain
hundreds of TCP retransmissions and the largest numbers of Unmatched
Request and Unmatched Response alarms in the datasets. This suggests
that the large numbers of alarms are caused by bad link quality.
5. Practical applications
This section discusses the practical applications of PeriodAnalyser. In
particular, it shows how PeriodAnalyser can be used for intrusion detection as
well as for testing intrusion detection systems and evaluating the performance
of industrial control devices.
5.1. Intrusion detection
As discussed in Section 4, PeriodAnalyser and the Monitor module can
be used for anomaly-based intrusion detection. In this case, the Learner
module constructs a cycle-oriented normal model of industrial control system
communications from a training dataset. The Monitor module then detects
deviations from the learned behavior in live network traﬃc. Alarms raised by
the Monitor module indicate anomalies. However, it is important to note that
not all variations in periodic behavior are relevant from a security perspective.
For example, the time-based alarms may only indicate performance issues,
not security threats. In fact, most of the alarms observed for the MMS 2
dataset were due to small variations in the durations of iterations, which
were likely caused by normal network delays. Optionally, time-based alarms
could be disabled in such instances.
The three datasets used in this research were free of attacks. At this
time, no empirical datasets containing malicious industrial control network
traﬃc are available. Hence, the following discussion is based on some of the
general attack classes proposed in [17]. Where available, concrete types of
attacks are presented from an open access list of real-world attack signatures
used in the Quickdraw Intrusion Detection System [10]. The list includes
signatures for protecting Modbus TCP and DNP3 [9], two common SCADA
communications protocols.
• Information gathering attacks: These attacks, which typically precede
other attacks, are used to gather as much knowledge as possible about
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the targeted system. A typical way to acquire this information is
through scans such as the Modbus TCP Function Code Scan. In gen-
eral, attacks of this type require a large number of parameters (ad-
dresses, ports, function codes, etc.) to be tested. Therefore, they likely
make use of requests that are not observed during the learning phase
and, therefore, trigger New Request alarms. Even if it is possible to
craft an attack using the learned periodic requests, the scan would still
be identiﬁed by Repeated Request alarms.
• Denial-of-service attacks: These attacks prevent legitimate users from
accessing services or negatively impact the provision of services. For
example, the DNP3 Unsolicited Response Storm attack attempts to
overload a DNP3 device by sending a number of unsolicited response
packets, which are normally used to report alarms. Once again, if the
attack uses new requests, they would be identiﬁed immediately. The
attacker could attempt to repeat the messages from a cycle rapidly, but
this would also generate a large number of Repeated Request alarms.
While a small number of repeated requests do not pose a security
threat, a large number may indicate an attempt to overload the receiver
by rapidly repeating requests in a cycle. Note that such attacks are not
detected by the approach proposed by Goldenberg and Wool [13].
• Network attacks: These attacks manipulate network protocols. For in-
stance, the Modbus TCP Clear Counters and Diagnostic Registers at-
tack uses a single packet with a speciﬁc function code to clear counters
and diagnostic registers in a device in an attempt to avoid detection.
The Modbus TCP Slave Device Busy Exception Code Delay attack
answers every request with a “device is busy” message, preventing a
response timeout. Such attacks rely on the use of uncommon requests,
which would readily be identiﬁed by New Request alarms. In general,
New Request alarms also provide powerful protection against data in-
jection attacks.
• Buﬀer overﬂow attacks: These attacks attempt to gain control of a
process or crash it by overﬂowing its buﬀer. For example, the Modbus
TCP – Illegal Packet Size (Possible DoS) attack sends a single packet
with an illegal packet size, exploiting a bug in the implementation of
the protocol stack. The attacks rely on forging invalid packets that
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are, by deﬁnition, not commonly used. Thus, they also generate New
Request alarms.
• Anomalies not related to malicious activity: Alarms created by the
Monitor module can also be used to detect anomalies that are not or
only indirectly related to malicious activity. For example, a Long It-
eration alarm indicates that a sender has become inactive. However,
SCADA applications are designed to deal with delays [2], so accept-
ing delays that are longer than those learned from the data might be
acceptable or even desirable. Finally, while a small number of Incom-
plete Iteration and Unmatched Request/Response alarms do not pose
a serious threat (they are likely due to a network performance problem
or a probe causing packet loss), a large number of alarms indicate that
the receiver has become inactive. Note, however, that the threshold at
which these alarms become a security issue is dependent on the envi-
ronment. For instance, water processes are considerably slower than
electric processes, so a water treatment system might tolerate larger
delays.
In summary, the proposed approach provides strong protection against
data injection. Only requests commonly used during normal behavior can
be used in attacks, otherwise New Request alarms would be issued. Further-
more, attacks created using normal requests must be sent in a manner that
does not diﬀer considerably from normal periodic behavior, otherwise they
will cause Repeated Request alarms.
5.2. Synthetic trace generation
The previous section discussed how the models learned by PeriodAnalyser
could be used to identify anomalies in observed sequences of messages for
the purpose of intrusion detection. In contrast, this section discusses how
the models can also be used to output sequences of messages. The goal is
to generate synthetic message traces that are realistic (i.e., those that have
properties close to what are observed in real systems).
Like other models, the models obtained by PeriodAnalyser are abstrac-
tions of reality and, hence, represent the behavior of a real system only to
a certain degree. The Tokenizer module abstracts protocol-dependent infor-
mation by extracting speciﬁc ﬁelds from requests and responses to gener-
ate protocol-independent tokens (see Table 1). While enough information is
20
maintained to uniquely identify requests and to match requests to responses,
the contents of the responses are mostly ignored. To use a real-world exam-
ple, the model can be used to capture how often the water level of a tank is
checked, but not the actual water level in the tank.
In the PeriodAnalyser models, a learned cycle carries information about
the sources and destinations of the exchanged messages, the numbers and
types of requests that are allowed in the cycle, and the minimum duration,
maximum duration and standard deviation. Consequently, a learned model
enables the generation of synthetic traces that reﬂect the randomness of the
processes observed in the real system. The order of the requests and their
timing can be permuted according to the learned cycle information.
Such synthetic traces are useful for various purposes. In the context of
cyber security and intrusion detection, a major challenge for researchers is
the lack of publicly-available traces of industrial control network traﬃc, pri-
marily because asset owners are reluctant to provide real data for reasons
of sensitivity. Synthetic traces generated using the PeriodAnalyser models
can be combined with attack traﬃc to obtain the ground truth for testing
and evaluating intrusion detection systems. The fact that the contents of
response messages are not modeled is not necessarily a drawback. Many
intrusion detection systems, for example, ﬂow-based intrusion detection sys-
tems [23], as well as, to some extent, the intrusion detection system discussed
in Section 5.1, do not rely on deep packet inspection.
A second application area is the creation of load generators for evaluating
the performance of control system components in simulators. An empirical
data trace is often inadequate for this task because it reﬂects the behavior
of one speciﬁc system. In contrast, the proposed model-generated synthetic
traces are scalable and ﬂexible. For example, it is possible to “clone” the
cycle model of a programmable logic controller with diﬀerent source and
destination addresses, thereby simulating a large industrial control network.
Furthermore, the distributions of durations could be varied, for example, to
simulate the behavior of an industrial control system that uses a high-latency
communications network.
6. Conclusions
The PeriodAnalyser tool presented in this paper embodies an automated
approach for learning traﬃc models from industrial control network traﬃc.
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The novel approach addresses the limitations of existing approaches by di-
rectly exploiting the periodicity inherent in industrial control network traﬃc.
The “semantic gap” of spectral analysis is avoided by identifying the mes-
sages that produce periodic behavior. Also, timing information is captured
directly, making it possible to identify and monitor the frequencies at which
messages are exchanged. This enables the approach to automatically learn
multiple periods and, therefore, adapt to a variety of industrial control sys-
tem environments.
The approach was evaluated using three real-world traﬃc traces that
covered the Modbus and MMS protocols. The results show that most ﬂows
of SCADA protocols such as Modbus can be accurately modeled by the ap-
proach. Although more ﬂow variations are encountered in distributed control
protocols such as MMS, a large number of ﬂows comprise periodic requests
that are also accurately modeled by the approach.
The traﬃc modeling approach has two important applications. The ﬁrst
application is intrusion detection, which provides two layers of protection.
One layer of protection is a whitelist created by learning the polling requests
issued to ﬁeld devices, which prevents data injection attacks by third parties.
The second layer, which involves learning the rate at which requests are sent,
helps prevent denial-of-service attacks that attempt to overload ﬁeld devices
with (whitelisted) requests. In addition, the learned rate also helps detect
when speciﬁc requests are not sent for a long period of time (e.g., when the
process responsible for issuing the requests becomes inactive). The second
key application provided by the traﬃc modeling approach is the generation of
meaningful synthetic traﬃc traces. These traﬃc traces can be used as ground
truth to test intrusion detection systems or as scalable loads to evaluate the
performance of industrial control devices.
Future research will focus on enhancing the Learner and Monitor modules
to ascertain if assumptions can be made about periodic request cycles (e.g.,
checking if requests are sent in a ﬁxed order). Also, research will attempt
to extend the approach and the implementation to handle other industrial
control protocols such as DNP3 and IEC 60870-5-104.
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(c) Flow reading unconstrained addresses.
Figure 3: Extracts of three ﬂows observed in the datasets.
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(c) MMS 2.
Figure 4: Eﬀects of N for the three datasets.
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